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present confused state of the science of psychology, it is somewhat
dangerous, especially in the field of constitutional law, to draw con-
clusions based upon human motivation. Forms of coercion have been
known to the law since ancient time, and it is too uncertain a matter
to say that there is or is not coercion unless some form of coercion
known to the law, or similar to it, is or is not used.
The minority opinion proceeds with clear logic, starting with the
premise that the power to appropriate for the general welfare is an
independent source of power. It simply applies the doctrine of implied
powers established by McCulloch v. Maryland. Although their judg-
ment in applying it would seem to be sound, it is not at all clear that,
as they say, the doctrine has been reversed by the majority in its
application to the welfare clause. In reality the majority did recognize
it as applicable to the clause but found the Act to go beyond any
implication of power in it. In the exercise of judgment upon this
point it is evident that the majority and minority were both controlled
by their divergent views upon the function of the Court. The ma-
jority may have been influenced by the wisdom of the Act as a solution
of the farm problem. The minority judges were m conference with
the majority on this case. We were not. They also read the majority
opinion before the minority was written. The majority were certainly
influenced by the type of legislation of which the Act was an example.
The decision, moreover, cannot be said to prohibit all forms of
regulation in connection with the expenditure of money for the general
welfare. There is a vast difference between regulation of the type
effected by the Act and other regulation cited in the minority opinion,
as for example, grants in aid of agricultural education on condition
that it be so used. The majority would have no difficulty in upholding
such a grant.
This case alone will probably not lead to any amendment of the
Constitution which will expand or make definite the powers of Con-
gress, for the spending of money to procure regulation is limited in its
scope. An amendment will only come as a result of a strong public
opinion to give to Congress the power by command to regulate agri-
culture and industry It is more likely to lead to restrictions upon the
powers of the Supreme Court.
RECENT CASE NOTES
TRIAL-INFORMING JURY OF LIABILrrY INSURANCE-CURING OF PREJUDICE.-In
tort action against motorist, plaintiff recovered $3,400.00 for death of twelve
year old girl. Appellant assigns alleged misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in
eliciting testimony from his witness on redirect examination that insurance
agent had investigated accident after questioning prospective jurors on voir
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dire concerning their acquaintance with the insurance agent and their connec-
tion with a mutual automobile insurance company. Held, that error, if any,
was cured by instruction to jury to disregard the testimony and not allow
themselves to be prejudiced by it or the voir dire examination. 1
The general rule that evidence 2 which shows, or which might lead the
jury to infer, that the defendant in an action for a personal injury is protected
by liability insurance is madmissable, because it is not relevant to the question
of his liability and because it is thought to create in the mind of the juror a
prejudice3 in favor of the plaintiff is by the majority of courts relaxed enough
to permit the plaintiff's attorney, in good faith,4 to question the prospective
juror on voir dire concerning his interest in liability insurance companies.5
This is the position adopted by the Indiana courts.6 In view of the number
of people who are interested as agents, employees, and shareholders in stock
companies, or participants in mutual companies7 this protection seems not
unwarranted.8  Of course, this privilege must be exercised with at least
apparent good faithO and the attorney who seeks to prejudice the jury by
the voir dire examination, is in danger of having a judgment in his favor
reversed.1 0  As has been said,l' "the line of demarcation cannot be
1 Clevenger v. Kern (1935), - Ind. -, 197 N. E. 731.
2 This rule is applicable not only to evidence, strictly speaking, but also
to questions or statements by counsel.
3 Taggart v. Keebler (1926), 198 Ind. 633, 154 N. E. 485.
4 Inland Steel Co. v. Gillespie (1914), 181 Ind. 633, 104 N. E. 76, Martin v.
Lilly (1918), 188 Ind. 139, 145, 121 N. E. 443.
G A list supporting the minority view is given in: Inland Steel Co. v.
Gillespie (1914), 181 Ind. 633, 646, 104 N. E. 443. Cases supporting the
majority rule may be found. 56 A. L. R. 1454 (1928), 74 A. L. R. 860 (1931),
95 A. L. R. 404 (1935). In 95 A. L. R. 404, the majority rule is spoken of
as "the almost universal view."6 Annadall v. Union Cement & Lime Co. (1908), 42 Ind. App. 264, 84 N. E.
359; Goff v. Kokomo Brass Works (1909), 43 Ind. App. 642, 88 N. E. 312;
Beyer v. Saffron (1925), 84 Ind. App. 512, 151 N. E. 620; M. O'Connor & Co.
v. Gillaspy (1908), 170 Ind. 428, 83 N. E. 738, Ft. Wayne Checker Cab Co. v.
Davis (1929), 90 Ind. App. 30, 165 N. E. 764, Marmon Motor Car Co. v.
Schafer (1931), 93 Ind. App. 588, 178 N. E. 863.
7 In M. O'Connor & Co. v. Gillaspy, supra, the court said. "It is a matter
of common knowledge that numerous companies are engaged in such insurance
in this state."
8 In Goff v. Kokomo Brass Works, supra, the court quoted with approval
from Spoonick v. Basher-Brooks Co. (1903), 89 Minn. 354, 358, 94 N. W
1079, "it would be impossible to say that any person connected with the
indemnifying company as stockholder or otherwise could be a proper person
to sit as a juror in a case the result of which might be of pecuniary interest
to such company."
M. O'Connor & Co. v. Gillaspy, supra, gave as a further reason: "The
examination of jurors on their voir dire is not only for the purpose of exposing
grounds of challenge for cause, if any exist, but also to elicit such facts as
will enable counsel to exercise their right of peremptory challenge intelli-
gently"
9 For a discussion of the objectivity of the "good faith" of counsel, see
17 Iowa Law Review 501.
10 Evansville Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Robertson, Admx. (1913), 55 Ind.
App. 351, 100 N. E. 689; Inland Steel v. Gillespie, supra; Martin v. Lilly,
supra.
11 Faber v. Reiss Coal Co. (1905), 124 Wis. 554, 102 N. W 1049.
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readily drawn," and in the final analysis the conduct of the voir dire must,
and should, be left largely to the discretion of the trial judge.12
The proposition that as a general rule the mention of insurance during the
examination of witnesses is improper and prejudicial is almost universally
accepted1s; the question in dispute is whether the mention of insurance is so
prejudicial that an instruction to the jury to disregard it as irrelevant fails
to cure the impropriety and remove the prejudice.
If the injection of liability insurance is incurably prejudicial, the appellant
in the principal case was entitled to have the submission set aside, and the
refusal of the trial court to grant appellant's motion to set aside the submis-
sion was error necessitating reversal. However, if the injection is not incur-
ably prejudicial, appellant was not entitled to have the submission set aside.
In the absence of a specific motion to strike the answer and instruct the jury
to disregard it, it will be assumed, in the absence of a showing to the contrary,
that the jury heeded the general instruction given by the trial judge, upon
appellant's request, to the effect that the question of defendant's (appellant)
liability' 4 insurance was not relevant.
Although there is little semblance of accord in the decisions as to whether
or not a mention of insurance is incurably prejudiciall5 the preferable, and
probably the prevailing, rule seems to be that unless the mention of insurance
was made or induced by plaintiff's attorney wilfully, or in bad faith,16 the
discretion of the trial court as to whether an instruction will remove the
prejudice will not be disturbed so long as it does not affirmatively appear
from the record that the jury was prejudiced. This seems to be the rule in
Indiana.17
This rule places the primary responsibility for the conduct of the trial
upon the trial judge, who is best able to weigh the probable effect of the infor-
mation concerning defendant's liability insurance upon the jury; but permits
the court of review to correct cases of flagrant violations. Under such a
rule, each case depends largely upon its peculiar facts, and the relative pre-
ponderance of the evidence,1 8 the size of the verdict, 19 the conduct of the
12 In Marmon Motor Car Co. v. Schafer, supra, the court said, "The inflec-
tion of the voice or the expression of the face may carry some innuendo,
which only the trial judge is capable of passing upon. Where the trial court
has passed on the question in a motion for a new trial, an appellate tribunal
should be slow in reversing, especially so in the absence of a positive showing
on an abuse of discretion."
Is Support of the general rule is found in cases cited in: 56 A. L. R.
1419 (1928), 74 A. L. R. 850 (1931), 95 A. L. R. 389 (1935).
According to a 4-3 decision in Jessup v. Davis (1926), 115 Neb. 1,
211 N. W 190, 56 A. L. R. 1403, Nebraska has refused to adopt the general
rule.
14 Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Orwig (1921), 150 Ark. 635, 235 S. W 390;
Ontil v. Poli (1923), 100 Conn. 64, 123 Atd. 272.
15 A perusal of the cases cited in the Current Digest for the last two years
showed twelve decisions holding the prejudice was removed by trial court's
instruction, and five decisions holding that the prejudice was not removed.
16 Taggart v. Keebler (1926), 198 Ind. 633, 154 N. E. 485.
17 Burford v. Dantrick (1913), 55 Ind. App. 384, 103 N. E. 953, Home Tele-
phone Co. v. Weir (1913), 53 Ind. App. 466, 101 N. E. 1020.
18 Martin v. Lilly, supra.
10 Knuckler v. Weathersby, D. C. (1934), 72 Fed. 2nd 69; Brown McClain
Transfer Co. v. Major's Adm'r (1933), - Ky. -, 65 S. W 2nd 992, 996.
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attorney,2 0 the manner in which the mention of insurance came out2 1 and the
action of the judge in attempting to cure the prejudice, 2 2 all are important in
determining whether or not the prejudice which is assumed to arise on the men-
tion of insurance was removed.
In the principal case, regardless of whether or not we agree with the
holding "that the facts and circumstances as presented by the. record in this
case do not warrant its reversal," we have no quarrel with the court's con-
ception and statement of the law. L. W
CRIMINAL LAW-EMBEZZLEMENT-INTENT To DEFRAUv.-Defendant was
cashier in charge of trust affairs for a bank. The bank was the guardian
of Mary A. Yoder. Defendant bought some bonds for $430.33 and sold them
to the ward's estate for $2,000.00. Defendant was indicted under Sec. 10-
1704 Burns Indiana Statutes, Annotated (1933) for embezzling $1,569.67 of the
ward's funds and convicted. Defendant appeals. Held, that such a sale by
a guardian to his ward is criminal even if the guardian believed that he was
within his rights in doing so.1
The relation of guardian and ward is fiduciary,2 and a fiduciary is
required to exercise absolute good faith.3 Because of this relation the transac-
tions between guardian and ward are watched with jealous care. 4 The
guardian when acting officially must act solely for his beneficiary, and the law
will look with disfavor on transactions between a guardian and his ward. 5
So where a ward subsequently attacks a transaction between guardian and
ward, the law will presume fraud, on the grounds of public policy, and
leave it to the defendant to rebut the presumption.0 So where a guardian
acquires an interest adverse to that of his ward he may be removed,7 nor
will he be allowed to retain any advantage derived from this adverse
interest.8
In the instant case we have a prosecution for embezzlement. Embezzlement
is the fraudulent appropriation or conversion of the goods of another by one
who is rightfully in possession of them.0 The embezzlement statutes were
primarily intended to reach and punish the fraudulent conversion of property
which could not be punished as larceny because of the absence of a trespass
and their object must be borne in mind in construing them.10 There can be
no embezzlement under the statutes where there is no intent to defraud,11
20 Scott v. Vaugh (1934), - Kan. -, 37 P 2nd 1012.
21 Smith v. Sabin (1934), - Cal. App. -, 31 P 2nd 230.
22 Burns v. Getty (1933), - Idaho -, 24, P 2nd 31.
1 Yoder v. State (1935), 194 N. E. 645 (Ind).
2 Bogert, Trusts (1921), 34.
8 Flynn v. Colbert (1925), 251 Mass. 489, 146 N. E. 784.
4 Euler v. Euler (1913), 55 Ind. App. 547, 102 N. E. 856.
5 National Surety Co. v. State (1913), 181 Ind. 54, 103 N. E. 108.
6 National Surety Co. v. State (1913), 181 Ind. 54, 103 N. E. 108.
7 Sec. 2233, California Civil Code (1931).8 Taylor v. Calvert (1893), 138 Ind. 67, 37 N. E. 534.
O State v. Ensley (1909), 177 Ind. 501, 97 N. E. 113, Axtell v. State (1911),
173 Ind. 713, 91 N. E. 354.
10 Commonwealth v. Hays (1859), 80 Mass. 64.
11 Ridge v. State (1923), 192 Ind. 639, 137 N. E. 759.
